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DRAWING ON DAUBERT: BRINGING RELIABILITY TO THE
FOREFRONT IN THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
ABSTRACT
Eyewitness identification evidence has long been recognized for its
tendency toward unreliability and its susceptibility to suggestion. At the core of
eyewitness identification is the ability to recognize unfamiliar faces—a
memory process that can be distorted by factors intrinsic to the nature of
memory, as well as by extrinsic suggestive identification procedures, such as
lineups. Because the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant is often at
stake in cases where eyewitness identification is at issue, this potential for
distortion is particularly worrisome. In fact, this concern is borne out in
statistical data about wrongful convictions in the United States, showing that
mistaken identifications are the leading cause of wrongful convictions in the
country.
Eyewitness identification evidence possesses a unique combination of
factors that distinguishes it from other types of evidence: not only is it prone to
unreliability, but it also has a strong influence on the jury. Further, it is not
susceptible to the traditional protections of the adversarial system, such as
confrontation and cross-examination. These features set eyewitness
identification testimony apart from other types of evidence, warranting special
attention by courts. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
particularly sensitive nature of eyewitness identification testimony in a line of
cases in which it found that an identification procedure has the potential to be
so unnecessarily suggestive, and thus unreliable, that it violates a defendant’s
due process rights. However, the current rule only affords protection to cases
in which law enforcement officers orchestrated an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure, disregarding the equally strong potential for unreliable
identifications stemming from situations without any improper police behavior
or any suggestive behavior at all.
This Comment argues that the Court’s current framework for approaching
the problem of eyewitness identification testimony is too narrow and underinclusive. This Comment proposes that courts should look to Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals’s heightened evidentiary standard for admitting
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expert scientific evidence, with its focus on reliability, as a guide for admitting
eyewitness identification testimony. Then, this Comment proposes a new
framework for admitting eyewitness identification testimony, which, like the
Daubert standard, would be centered on a reliability assessment that is based
on factors known to affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification.
INTRODUCTION
Human memory, while remarkable in many ways, does not operate like a
video camera. On the contrary, what people remember is greatly influenced—
and often distorted—by interactions between the mind and its surroundings.
Nowhere is the potential fallibility inherent in human memory more glaring
than in the courtroom, where eyewitnesses regularly testify to the identity of a
criminal defendant based on their memory of a culprit’s face.
Through efforts such as the Innocence Project,1 the potential for mistaken
eyewitness identification has become evident.2 In fact, the leading cause of
wrongful convictions in the United States is mistaken eyewitness
identification;3 staggeringly, more than 75% of innocent prisoners exonerated
by DNA evidence were found guilty at least in part on the basis of mistaken
eyewitness identifications.4 This statistic highlights the miscarriage of justice
that can occur if an eyewitness makes a mistaken identification: not only is an
innocent person imprisoned, but the true perpetrator of the crime also escapes
justice.
As efforts such as the Innocence Project suggest, mistaken eyewitness
identifications frustrate the truth-seeking goals of the justice system. Courts
have attempted to improve identification procedures, such as lineups, to
1 Mission Statement, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.
php (last visited May 14, 2013). The Innocence Project is an organization whose mission is to “assist prisoners
who could be proven innocent through DNA testing,” many of whom were convicted based in part on a
mistaken eyewitness identification. Id.; accord Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited May 14, 2013).
2 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 1; see Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 55, 78 (2008); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 530–31 (2005); Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification
and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 396 (1987).
3 See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011); Garrett, supra note 2.
4 See Garrett, supra note 2, at 78 (stating that in one study “[t]he overwhelming number of convictions
of the innocent involved eyewitness identification—158 of 200 cases (79%)”); Gross et al., supra note 2, at
544 (finding mistaken identifications in 88% of exonerations in rape cases and in 50% of exonerations in
murder cases); Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 1 (finding mistaken identification played a role in
nearly 75% of overturned convictions).
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prevent mistaken identifications; however, courts must also address eyewitness
identification mistakes that arise not only from procedural problems in control
of the justice system, but also from the imperfect nature of memory itself.
This Comment argues that the current framework for evaluating the
admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence does not adequately filter
unreliable identifications that stem from both procedural problems and from
the inherent fallibility of memory. Therefore, this Comment proposes that
Daubert’s heightened evidentiary standard, which emphasizes the reliability of
evidence as the main factor in its admissibility, should act as a
recommendation for how trial courts should approach the admissibility of
eyewitness identification evidence.5 Like Daubert, the proposed framework
would emphasize the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence as
essential to its admissibility. Part I of this Comment reviews the psychological
literature on possible forms of memory distortion that can affect the reliability
of eyewitness recall of a culprit’s face, thus leading to mistaken eyewitness
identifications. Part I also discusses some ways in which courts have attempted
to address these problems and how such measures have largely proven
insufficient. Part II then argues that eyewitness identification testimony is
distinguishable from other types of eyewitness evidence due to its unique
combination of characteristics, warranting a higher evidentiary standard. Part
III summarizes the Daubert framework and the rationale for the heightened
evidentiary standard it introduces. Finally, Part IV suggests a novel framework
for eyewitness identification testimony in which Daubert—with its heightened
evidentiary standard based on a reliability assessment—is used to inform
decision makers about the importance of reliability in the admissibility of all
eyewitness identification evidence.6
I. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
The potential for unreliability in eyewitness identification testimony may
ultimately lie with the very nature of memory itself. Although many imagine
memory as akin to a video recorder, capturing a stable and accurate account of
a particular event, memory is in fact vulnerable to bias, intervening events, and

5 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Court established a gatekeeping role for trial judges
in which the admissibility of expert evidence is conditioned upon a finding of reliability. 509 U.S. 579, 592
(1993).
6 This framework would apply to all eyewitness identifications, whether yielded from suggestive
procedures or not, based on criteria that focus on the reliability of the particular eyewitness evidence.
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failures in perception.7 Memory is a reconstructive process, with the brain
filling in gaps missing from memory.8 Thus, at any point between the initial
perception and recall of a face, an eyewitness’s memory of that face is
susceptible to distortion.9 The following sections discuss the variables that may
affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications as well as the safeguards that
are currently in place to protect against these variables.
A. Psychological Research on Variables Affecting Eyewitness Evidence
Variables that may affect whether eyewitness identification memory is
altered or distorted may either be “estimator variables” or “system variables.”
Estimator variables are factors that stem from the inherently unreliable nature
of memory and over which the justice system has no control, while system
variables are factors that stem from identification procedures under the control
of the justice system.10
1. Estimator Variables
Distortions in memory that lead to mistaken identifications may arise from
estimator variables—problems that are inherent in the nature of memory
itself.11 Such estimator variables are out of the control of the legal system and
thus are particularly problematic because there is no way to prevent the
eyewitness from being influenced by them.12 Estimator variables that
commonly affect eyewitness identification include lighting, distance from the
suspect, and race of the suspect; these variables can act during the initial
perception of an event, or during encoding, storage, or retrieval of a memory.13
Estimator variables may impact an eyewitness’s memory of a perpetrator’s
face during the perception of the face and the encoding of the face into
7

ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
Id.
9 Id. Thus, memory of faces can be affected during the encoding of the memory, during retrieval or
recall of the memory, or in the intermediate time between encoding and retrieval when the memory is in
storage. Id. Distortions that occur during encoding tend to be due to variables beyond the control of the justice
system (estimator variables), while distortions that occur during retrieval tend to be due to variables within the
control of the justice system (system variables). Id.
10 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 279
(2003).
11 See id.
12 See Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 970 (1977).
13 See id. at 976–89.
8
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memory.14 For example, the viewing conditions under which the eyewitness is
exposed to the face of the perpetrator, such as proximity to the perpetrator and
lighting, impact whether the eyewitness ever accurately perceives the
perpetrator’s face.15 Without adequate conditions for the eyewitness to view
the perpetrator, the eyewitness’s memory of the perpetrator will be
incomplete.16
Further, characteristics of the perpetrator, such as the perpetrator’s race,
may affect the eyewitness’s accuracy in recognizing the perpetrator.17
Specifically, studies have shown that eyewitnesses who make cross-race
identifications of a perpetrator are less likely to make an accurate identification
than they would for a perpetrator of their own race.18
Additionally, situations in which an eyewitness encounters a perpetrator are
usually highly stressful, particularly if the eyewitness is the victim of the
crime.19 High levels of eyewitness stress during perception and encoding are
associated with lower rates of accurate identifications than situations with a
moderate level of stress.20 Similarly, if a weapon is present during the
commission of the crime to which the eyewitness is testifying, studies have
14

See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 281–82.
See Note, supra note 12, at 978.
16 See id.
17 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 280–81.
18 Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in
Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 5 (2001) (suggesting that around
80% of samples reviewed show a statistically significant own-race bias for memory for faces); Wells & Olson,
supra note 10, at 280–81; Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness
Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 231 (2001) (noting that white
witnesses were more likely to make a mistaken identification of a black suspect (35% of mistaken
identifications) than of a white suspect (28% of mistaken identifications)).
19 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 282.
20 See, e.g., id. In a meta-analysis of studies of stress and eyewitness identifications, high levels of stress
tended to be accompanied by lower accuracy in eyewitness recall of facial features and fewer correct
eyewitness identifications. See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High
Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699–704 (2004). The effect size of the
correlation between stress and accuracy in identifications was -.31, which is a moderate effect size. Id.
Additionally, in another study, subjects were shown either a violent crime or a nonviolent crime; then subjects
were asked to provide details about the crime. Brian R. Clifford & Jane Scott, Individual and Situational
Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 352 (1978). Subjects shown the nonviolent crime
were significantly more likely to accurately recall the details of the crime than those who viewed the violent
crime, suggesting that higher arousal and stress may impede memory. Id. at 355–56. In another study, subjects’
anxiety levels were monitored with heart rate monitors during exposure to faces; higher levels of anxiety
during a stressful situation were associated with a less accurate description of a person’s face. Charles A.
Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly
Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 275 (2004).
15
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shown that an eyewitness may be prone to “weapon focus,” in which an
eyewitness’s recall for details of the crime—including the perpetrator’s face—
is diminished because the eyewitness’s attention is diverted by his focus on the
weapon.21
Between the time when memory of a face is encoded and retrieved, an
eyewitness may experience unconscious transference.22 Through unconscious
transference, an eyewitness may mistakenly come to believe that an innocent
bystander that the eyewitness glimpsed around the time of the crime is actually
the perpetrator.23
2. System Variables
In contrast to estimator variables, system variables are factors within the
control of the legal system that may affect the memory of faces.24 System
variables include factors in the procedures used by law enforcement to elicit
eyewitness identifications—most commonly photo or in-person lineups.25
Improper lineups and other identification procedures may distort an
eyewitness’s recall of the perpetrator’s face, thus impairing identification.26 In
particular, eyewitness identifications become susceptible to mistake following
21 See, e.g., Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 282; Kerri L. Pickel, The Influence of Context on the
“Weapon Focus” Effect, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299, 299, 301 (1999) (finding that this effect can be caused
by any unusual object, including weapons, present during the commission of a crime). A meta-analysis of
twelve studies of weapon focus found a small but statistically significant effect size in which the presence of a
weapon decreased an eyewitness’s ability to correctly identify a perpetrator from a lineup, as well as a medium
effect size in which the presence of a weapon decreased a witness’s ability to identify individual features of the
perpetrator’s appearance. Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 414, 417 (1992). Similarly, another study found that when subjects were shown a
person with a gun, their eye movements centered on the gun; further, subjects were less accurate in identifying
a person holding a gun out of a lineup (accurate identification 15% of the time) compared to a person holding a
check (accurate identification 35% of the time). Elizabeth F. Loftus, Geoffrey R. Loftus & Jane Messo, Some
Facts About “Weapon Focus,” 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 60–61 (1987).
22 See, e.g., Deborah Davis et al., ‘Unconscious Transference’ Can Be an Instance of ‘Change
Blindness,’ 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 605, 607 (2008); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1487, 1501–02 (2008).
23 See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note 22, at 611 (finding that an innocent bystander who was present in a
video of a theft was frequently mistaken for the perpetrator); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Unconscious Transference in
Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 93, 96 (1976) (finding that while subjects picked the
correct perpetrator out of a lineup of five people an average of 84% of the time, if the true perpetrator was
absent, subjects picked an innocent bystander to the crime out of a lineup 60% of the time); Thompson, supra
note 22.
24 Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 285.
25 See id.
26 See id.
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the improper administration of identification procedures, including instructions
to the witness, the presentation of the lineup, the lineup administrator’s
knowledge of the suspect, and the lineup administrator’s feedback to the
witness.27 In addition, the accuracy of an eyewitness identification may be
influenced by the content of the lineup.28
Research has shown that lineup instructions affect the eyewitness’s
accuracy in picking the correct suspect from the lineup—particularly
instructions that give the eyewitness information about whether the culprit is
present in the lineup.29 For example, many biased instructions at a lineup fail to
mention that the culprit may or may not be present in the lineup; consequently,
eyewitnesses may believe the lineup administrator is implying that the culprit
is present in the lineup, forcing them to make a choice.30 Experiments have
suggested that in a culprit-absent lineup, if the eyewitness is given unbiased
instructions prior to the lineup—stating that the culprit may or may not be
present in the lineup—then the witness is less likely to choose one of the
innocent fillers.31 This instruction may help prevent a witness from
succumbing to the tendency to pick the filler that most resembles the actual
culprit when the culprit is not present in the lineup.32
Additionally, the mode of presentation of lineup members, either
sequentially or simultaneously, has also been shown to affect the accuracy of
an eyewitness’s choice from a lineup in laboratory experiments.33 Studies
suggest that eyewitnesses generally make fewer mistaken identifications if
27

See id.
Id. at 287.
29 Id. at 286.
30 See Michael R. Leippe et al., Cueing Confidence in Eyewitness Identifications: Influence of Biased
Lineup Instructions and Pre-Identification Memory Feedback Under Varying Lineup Conditions, 33 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 194, 196 (2009).
31 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 286–87; Leippe et al., supra note 30, at 196 (“Biased instructions
[where the administrator fails to inform the eyewitness that the culprit may not be present in the lineup] are
known to decrease the rate of lineup rejections and increase the rate of false identifications from lineups in
which the culprit is absent.”); Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 485 (1981) (noting that in culpritabsent lineups with biased instructions, 78% of subjects made a mistaken identification; conversely, in culpritabsent lineups with unbiased instructions, 33% of subjects made a mistaken identification).
32 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 287. A meta-analysis of biased lineup instructions bears out the
trend that unbiased instructions lead to lower rates of mistaken identification in culprit-absent lineups. Steven
E. Clark, A Re-Examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 395, 399 (2005). However, unbiased instructions, which state the culprit may or may not be
present in the lineup, may also reduce the rate of correct identifications in culprit-present lineups, likely
because the instructions make the eyewitnesses wary of their choice. Id.
33 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 288.
28
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lineup members are presented sequentially, or one-by-one, thus allowing the
witness to focus exclusively on whether each lineup member is recognizable as
the culprit.34 The traditional simultaneous lineup method, in which all lineup
members are presented at once, may encourage witnesses to make a relative
judgment by comparing the lineup members to one another.35 This may cause
the eyewitness to choose the member who most closely resembles the culprit,
as opposed to comparing his or her memory of the culprit to each individual
lineup member.36
Another system variable that affects eyewitness identification accuracy is
the administrator’s belief that one of the lineup members is the culprit.37 If the
lineup administrator knows who the target suspect is, the administrator may
consciously or unconsciously, through body language and facial expressions,
lead the eyewitness to choose the person whom the administrator believes to be
guilty—thus tainting the eyewitness’s choice.38
Similarly, studies demonstrate that if an administrator offers positive
feedback following an eyewitness identification affirming the eyewitness’s
choice, the eyewitness’s view of the identification may be distorted.39
Specifically, after receiving positive feedback following a choice from the
lineup, eyewitnesses retrospectively reported higher confidence in their

34 See Neil Brewer & Mathew A. Palmer, Eyewitness Identification Tests, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 77, 85 (2010) (U.K.); Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 288. In a meta-analysis of studies comparing
sequential and simultaneous lineups, 72% of eyewitnesses shown a sequential lineup correctly rejected all
lineup members in lineups where the culprit was absent; conversely, in a simultaneous lineup with the same
culprit-absent condition, only 49% of eyewitnesses correctly recognized that the culprit was not in the lineup.
Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A
Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 463 (2001).
35 Steblay et al., supra note 34, at 459.
36 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 288. Though sequential lineups tend to reduce mistaken
identifications, particularly when the culprit is absent from the lineup, this identification technique is not
without its critics: sequential lineups also tend to reduce the proportion of correct identifications. See Amina
Memon & Fiona Gabbert, Unravelling the Effects of Sequential Presentation in Culprit-Present Lineups, 17
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 703, 709 (2003).
37 Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 289.
38 See id. To remedy the problem of the eyewitness being influenced by the lineup administrator, police
could institute double-blind lineup procedures in which the lineup administrator is not aware of which lineup
member is the main suspect; in this way, the administrator’s biases cannot be picked up by the eyewitness. See
Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 627 (1998).
39 See Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis
of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 860 (2006).
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identification than those who did not receive positive feedback.40 This
highlights the weak correlation between eyewitness confidence and the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, a finding that has been replicated in
several psychological studies.41
Another system variable that may distort eyewitness identification accuracy
is the content of a lineup.42 In particular, lineups should consist of suspects
who match the general description of the perpetrator.43 If only one suspect in
the lineup matches the eyewitness’s initial description of the perpetrator, then
that suspect is the obvious choice for the eyewitness.44
B. Existing Safeguards for Reliability
As described above, although the potential for unreliability in eyewitness
identifications is increasingly clear, the manner in which courts should respond
is less certain. This section addresses the various ways in which the legal
system has thus far addressed the problem of the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications: a due process test for unnecessarily suggestive eyewitness
identifications as well as general procedural safeguards, including jury
instructions and expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
This section argues that these measures are insufficient to guard against the
danger of mistaken identifications due to the unique nature of eyewitness
identification evidence and its effect on the jury.

40 See id. In one experiment, researchers gave eyewitnesses either positive feedback, telling the
eyewitnesses they fingered the correct suspect, or no feedback following their identification from a lineup;
then, the researchers asked the eyewitnesses to rate their confidence in their identification and state how good
their view of the perpetrator was. Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”:
Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360,
363 (1998). Importantly, unbeknownst to the eyewitnesses, the lineup was entirely comprised of innocent
fillers, and thus any identification made by the eyewitnesses was mistaken. Id. Positive feedback from the
lineup administrator confirming the eyewitness’s identification led to higher confidence ratings by
eyewitnesses than the confidence ratings of eyewitnesses who received no feedback. Id. Interestingly, positive
feedback also caused eyewitnesses to retroactively report that they had a better view of the perpetrator than
eyewitnesses who received no feedback—despite both experimental groups being presented with identical
views of the perpetrator. Id.
41 See, e.g., Douglass & Steblay, supra note 39; Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence,
and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence–Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995).
42 See Wells et al., supra note 38, at 632.
43 See id.
44 Id.
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1. Due Process Test for Unnecessarily Suggestive Eyewitness
Identifications
The United States Supreme Court has addressed eyewitness identification
problems in the context of due process through a line of cases dealing with
suggestive identification procedures.45 Through these cases, the Court has
developed a flexible framework with which to determine whether an
eyewitness identification procedure is so suggestive, and thus prone to a
mistaken identification, that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment.46 If a court finds that a suggestive
identification procedure violates due process, then the eyewitness identification
elicited from the suggestive procedure is not admissible.47 The following line
of cases follows the development of the due process test for eyewitness
identifications, which was articulated in its current form in Manson v.
Brathwaite.
In Stovall v. Denno, a murder suspect was brought to the hospital where
one of his alleged victims was receiving medical treatment for injuries
sustained as a result of the crime in question.48 Once at the hospital, the suspect
was presented to the victim eyewitness in a “show-up” procedure in which the
eyewitness was presented with a single suspect and asked to identify whether
this suspect was in fact the perpetrator.49 The Court recognized that an
identification procedure may be “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that [it is a denial of] due process of law.”50
However, the Court also held that whether a given identification procedure
violates due process depends “on the totality of the circumstances surrounding
it.”51 In Stovall, because the show-up procedure was crucial given the ill health
of the eyewitness and the necessity of the eyewitness’s identification, the

45 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (holding that courts must implement a two-pronged
procedure for determining whether an identification procedure violates due process); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188 (1972) (noting that even an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure can be admissible if it has
sufficient aspects of reliability under the totality of the circumstances); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302
(1967) (explaining that whether a suggestive eyewitness identification procedure violated due process depends
on the “totality of the circumstances”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (holding that a
defendant is entitled to counsel at a post-indictment lineup).
46 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 109–17; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
47 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
48 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 295.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 302.
51 Id.
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totality of the circumstances warranted the show-up and thus it was not a
violation of due process.52
In Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court reiterated that use of a show-up
procedure alone did not violate due process because an identification may be
reliable despite the identification procedure’s suggestiveness.53 Thus, Biggers
focused on the reliability of eyewitness testimony yielded from unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures.54
The Supreme Court’s current approach to whether a suggestive
identification procedure violates due process is summarized in Manson v.
Brathwaite, in which the Court again emphasized the importance of reliability:
the admission of testimony from an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure “does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses
sufficient aspects of reliability.”55 Manson established a two-pronged
evaluation of the reliability of an eyewitness identification through the “totality
of the circumstances.”56
Under the first prong, a court considers whether the eyewitness
identification procedure that elicited the identification was unnecessarily
suggestive.57 If the identification procedure is not unnecessarily suggestive,
then the inquiry ends and the eyewitness identification testimony is
admissible.58 If, however, the identification procedure is found to be
unnecessarily suggestive, the eyewitness identification may still be
admissible.59 In that case, the court turns to the second prong of the Manson
test to determine whether the eyewitness identification is nevertheless reliable
despite the unnecessarily suggestive procedure.60 If the court finds that the

52

See id.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
54 In Biggers, the Court found that although the show-up at issue was an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure, the identification nevertheless possessed sufficient aspects of reliability under the totality of
circumstances: the eyewitness had viewed the perpetrator in both artificial light and moonlight, gave a
description to the police that matched the defendant, and expressed certainty about the accuracy of her
identification. Id. at 200–01. Thus, the Court found that the show-up did not violate due process. Id.
55 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977).
56 Manson, 432 U.S. 98.
57 Id. at 107.
58 See id. (“On the constitutional issue, the court stated that the first inquiry was whether the police used
an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification.”).
59 See id. at 106.
60 See id.
53
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eyewitness identification is reliable under the totality of the circumstances, the
evidence is admissible.61
Conversely, if the court finds that the eyewitness identification was
unreliable under the totality of the circumstances, then the evidence is
inadmissible.62 The Manson Court listed several factors that should be weighed
in determining reliability: the eyewitness’s view, attention, accuracy of the
description, and certainty, as well as the passage of time.63 State courts have
added to these factors, supplementing the reliability factors with emerging
psychological evidence.64
Importantly, the Manson test cannot by itself fully address the problem of
mistaken eyewitness identification. Although the Manson test considers the
reliability of the eyewitness identification, this analysis of reliability is only
triggered if courts find an impermissibly suggestive procedure.65 If there is no
impermissibly suggestive procedure, the Manson test does not consider the
reliability of the eyewitness identification.66 Because many eyewitness
identification errors can occur due to estimator variables, which are factors
related to the inherent unreliability of memory, the Manson test fails to address
reliability of eyewitness identifications that do not stem from suggestive
procedures within the justice system’s control.
Another critique of the Manson test is that, while the reliability prong can
only be triggered by a suggestive procedure, the factors considered by the
reliability prong are susceptible to distortions caused by the suggestive
procedure itself.67 Several of the factors that the Court noted as important in
determining reliability—view, attention, and certainty—depend on
retrospective self-reports.68 Thus, if there was a suggestive identification

61

See id.
See id.
63 Id. at 114.
64 See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the
Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1,
18 (2009). The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, has included factors such as cross-racial
identification and the presence of a weapon during the crime. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
65 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 106. Many courts have found that show-ups and single-photograph displays
are impermissibly suggestive procedures under the first prong of the Manson test. See, e.g., id. at 106–07; Neil
v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). In Manson itself, for example, the single-photograph display of the
defendant was impermissibly suggestive. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 106–07.
66 See Manson, 432 U.S. at 106.
67 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 64, at 17.
68 See id. at 18.
62
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procedure, as there is in every case which reaches the second reliability prong
of the Manson test, it is likely that the suggestive procedure distorted the
eyewitness’s self-report of one or more of these variables.69 For example, as
noted above, studies have shown that if an eyewitness is given positive
feedback after making an identification, the eyewitness’s retrospective selfreport of his confidence in the identification will increase.70 Thus, if a court
found that positive feedback was an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure—satisfying the first prong of the Manson test—then the influence of
that suggestive procedure may skew the self-report factors in the second
reliability prong of the test, such as eyewitness certainty in the identification.71
Therefore, the first prong of the Manson test is suspect due to its underinclusiveness; the second prong is suspect due to its reliance on subjective,
retroactive self-reports that are influenced by the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
In January 2012, the Supreme Court decided the latest case regarding
eyewitness identification testimony, Perry v. New Hampshire.72 Perry raised
the question of whether the first prong of the Manson test, which requires an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, was meant to only encompass
unnecessarily suggestive procedures that occur as a result of police
involvement.73
In Perry, the defendant was accused of breaking into a car.74 One
eyewitness claimed she saw a man breaking into the car; when the police
questioned her about the crime, the eyewitness looked out of her apartment
window, saw Perry outside, and identified him as the person she had seen
committing the crime.75 At trial, Perry claimed that this identification was
made under suggestive circumstances, since he was the only suspect that the
witness could choose while making the identification.76
The first prong of the Manson test that must be met is a finding of
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances;77 however, past applications of this

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 64, at 18.
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
See id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721–22.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110–13 (1977).
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prong have all involved unnecessarily suggestive procedures administered by
police.78 In Perry, the arguably suggestive circumstances were not a product of
a police identification procedure; rather, the eyewitness looked out the window
without any inducement by police.79
During oral arguments, Perry highlighted the underlying rationale of
Manson and other due process cases, in which the Court found that some
eyewitness evidence can be so unnecessarily suggestive—and consequently so
unreliable—that its admittance would be a violation of due process.80 Thus, the
defense argued, any unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, whether the result
of police orchestration or not, potentially violate due process.81
However, in Perry, the Court declined to extend the current due process
protections of Stovall, Biggers, and Manson to include unnecessarily
suggestive procedures that are not caused by police.82 Rather, the Court found
that the due process check on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications
only applied when suggestive circumstances were arranged by law
enforcement officers.83 The Court’s stated rationale for refusing to extend due
process protection to suggestive circumstances not orchestrated by the police
rested on both practical and ideological considerations.84
First, the Perry Court seized on the deterrence rationale raised in Manson,85
in which the Manson Court claimed that unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures orchestrated by the police should be subject to
exclusion so that the “police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive
procedures . . . for fear that their actions will lead to the exclusion of
identifications as unreliable.”86 Without any improper police conduct, the
Perry Court found the “deterrence rationale [to be] inapposite.”87

78

See, e.g., id. at 100−02 (applying the prong to a police-administered photograph identification
procedure).
79 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 725.
80 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 24–28, Perry, 132 S. Ct. 716 (No. 10-8974).
81 Id. at 14.
82 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720–21.
83 Id.
84 See id. at 726–27.
85 Id.
86 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
87 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726. While the deterrence rationale does not play a role in cases lacking improper
police conduct, this should not foreclose courts from extending due process protections to these types of cases.
The deterrence rationale would not be rendered ineffective in cases where there is police misconduct; it would
just not apply in cases where there was no police misconduct.
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The Court also stated that allowing courts to determine the admissibility of
identifications resulting from suggestive procedures outside of police control
would result in a “vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint
on the admission of evidence.”88 Further, the Court noted that other potentially
unreliable evidence, such as jailhouse informant testimony, is admissible.89
The Court also raised the concern that extending a trial judge’s role to
screening the reliability of identifications would usurp the role of the jury.90
The jury, and not the judge, traditionally decides the reliability of evidence.91
According to the Court, safeguards that are part of the adversarial system can
aid the jury in making a determination about the reliability of eyewitness
identifications.92 In particular, the defendant has the right to confront and
cross-examine eyewitnesses with the intent of unearthing flaws in the
eyewitness’s testimony that might shed light on the reliability of the
identification.93 Further, the defendant can request jury instructions that warn
about the potential for unreliability in eyewitness identifications.94 Finally,
both state and federal rules of evidence allow the trial judge “to exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial impact.”95
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the centrality of reliability in
the prior eyewitness identification cases.96 The dissent opined that any
eyewitness identification
yielded from unnecessarily suggestive
circumstances—regardless of whether it was orchestrated by the police—may
violate due process if it poses a substantial risk of misidentification.97 In
response to the import the majority placed on the deterrence rationale, the
dissent noted that the main concern in the previous eyewitness identification
cases was reliability.98 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the driving force of
the previous decisions was not police deterrence;99 rather, the Court in Manson
discussed deterrence only to rebut concerns that the totality-of-the88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 723, 727.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 729; accord FED. R. EVID. 403.
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 735–36.
Id.
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circumstances test would have less of a deterrent effect for law enforcement
than a per se exclusion rule of all identifications resulting from a suggestive
procedure.100 Thus, the dissent considered the importance placed on the
deterrence rationale—which is secondary to reliability in the Manson
opinion—to be misplaced.101
The dissent also addressed the majority’s concerns about usurping the role
of the jury—namely, that extending due process protection to identifications
made under suggestive circumstances not orchestrated by the police would
lead to judges deciding the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence
instead of juries. The majority found this problematic because juries
traditionally decide the reliability of evidence.102 The dissent pointed out that
the previous eyewitness identification cases operated under the assumption that
eyewitness identifications are a necessary exception to the jury’s traditional
role in determining reliability.103 In particular, the dissent argued that the Court
has long recognized that eyewitness identification evidence resulting from
suggestive police procedures must be screened by trial judges for reliability,
taking the place of the jury’s reliability-assessing role.104 The majority in those
cases acknowledged that reliability of eyewitness identifications may not fall
within the province of the jury, perhaps due to the weight jurors tend to place
on eyewitness identification evidence or because the jury’s ability to assess
reliability of an eyewitness’s identification is “hindered by a witness’[s] false
confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification.”105
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s claim that the protections built
into the court system are sufficient to ensure the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence, concluding that the majority placed too much faith in
these protections.106 The following section discusses these built-in safeguards
and argues that they do not adequately solve the problem of unreliable
eyewitness identification evidence.

100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111−12 (1977).
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735–36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 737–39.
See id.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 737.
Id.
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2. Other Safeguards
As the majority in Perry noted, the criminal justice system provides
safeguards to encourage the general reliability of evidence,107 including the
right to be confronted with opposing witnesses and cross-examination of
witnesses.108 In theory, the right to be confronted with opposing witnesses and
the right to cross-examine provide an opportunity to reveal weaknesses and
inconsistencies in a witness’s testimony and to examine a witness’s
credibility.109 Often, courts refer to cross-examination as a protection against
unreliable eyewitness identification testimony.110 In particular, courts claim
that during cross-examination, the defense can highlight parts of the
eyewitness’s identification testimony that undermine the reliability of the
identification.111
Thus, the Court’s current approach is to trust that the built-in vehicle of
cross-examination will help the jury determine the reliability of eyewitness
identification testimony.112 However, this particular safeguard is not wholly
effective for eyewitness identification: whereas cross-examination developed
with a truth-seeking function, eyewitness identification testimony is not
plagued by untruthful witnesses but instead by often mistaken, and thus
potentially unreliable, ones.113
Further, cross-examination is a difficult platform in which to educate the
jury about the particular circumstances indicative of unreliability in eyewitness

107

Id. at 728–29 (majority opinion).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
109 Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691–92 (1931).
110 See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.14 (1977) (“‘Counsel can both cross-examine the
identification witnesses and argue in summation as to factors causing doubts as to the accuracy of the
identification—including reference to both any suggestibility in the identification procedure and any
countervailing testimony such as alibi.’” (quoting Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Leventhal, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“[J]urors using common sense and their faculties of observation can judge the credibility of an eyewitness
identification, especially since deficiencies or inconsistencies in an eyewitness’s testimony can be brought out
with skillful cross-examination.”).
111 See, e.g., Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.14 (noting that cross-examination may spotlight “factors causing
doubts” as to the testimony’s accuracy (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728–29 (explaining that traditional tools of the adversarial system help to
mitigate bias or suggestibility).
113 Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of
Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 766 (2007) (“A tool designed from its inception to root out liars
is ill-suited for the task of exposing the risk or reality of mistaken identification.”). This issue will be explored
in greater detail infra in Part II.
108
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identification testimony.114 Jurors do not have an intuitive understanding of the
factors that tend to make eyewitness identification testimony reliable or
unreliable.115 Without this basic foundation, jurors may have difficulty
grasping the proper significance of the cross-examination as it relates to
reliability.116
Many courts have instituted additional safeguards specific to eyewitness
identification evidence, including jury instructions117 and expert testimony
about the unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence.118 Each of these
methods attempts to address estimator variables119 outside of the control of the
justice system.120 Jurisdictions that allow jury instructions hope to focus jurors’
attention on some problems with the unreliability of eyewitness
114 See id. (stating that mistaken identification, as opposed to intentional misidentification, may present a
unique obstacle for successful cross-examination).
115 Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability
Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 195 (2006).
116 Epstein, supra note 113, at 772−74. For example, the defense may cross-examine an eyewitness about
his or her level of stress while observing a crime. The eyewitness may answer that his or her stress was high.
Though psychological studies suggest that eyewitnesses with high stress levels tend to have greater memory
impairment than eyewitnesses who experience moderate levels of stress, jurors generally imagine high stress
results in better memory. Id. at 746, 777−78. Thus, cross-examination can elicit responses that indeed are
pertinent to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, yet these responses are only meaningful to an audience
who understands the factors that contribute to unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. See id. at
777−78.
117 Some circuits provide model jury instructions related to eyewitness identification testimony. See
COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ch. 4.15, at 195–96 (2009) (“The value of the identification depends on the witness’[s]
opportunity to observe the person who committed the crime at the time of the offense and the witness’[s]
ability to make a reliable identification at a later time based on those observations. You must decide whether
you believe the witness’[s] testimony and whether you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the identification is
correct. . . . In addition, as you evaluate a witness’[s] identification testimony you should consider the
following questions as well as any other questions you believe are important . . . ask whether the witness was
able to observe and had an adequate opportunity to observe the person who committed the crime
charged. . . . [F]actors affect[ing] whether a witness has an adequate opportunity to observe . . . include the
length of time during which the witness observed the person, the distance between the witness and the person,
the lighting conditions, . . . [and] whether the witness knew the person from some prior experience . . . .”).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[U]nder certain narrow
circumstances, it will be error for trial courts to exclude qualified expert testimony on eyewitness perception
and memory.”); State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 32, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 (“[I]n cases where eyewitnesses are
identifying a stranger and where one or more established factors affecting accuracy are present, the testimony
of an eyewitness expert will meet rule 702’s requirement to ‘assist the trier of fact.’” (footnote omitted)).
Contra Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221, 229 (Ga. 1999) (excluding expert testimony because it was
“information that would [have been] provided by [the] witness” and it was “information that [was] within the
knowledge of the jurors and [was] not a proper subject for expert testimony”).
119 For a discussion of estimator variables, see supra text accompanying notes 11–13.
120 See Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the
Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 620 (2009).
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identification.121 However, studies suggest that general jury instructions
informing jurors of the unreliability of eyewitness identifications are not
effective in helping jurors to evaluate the reliability of the identification before
them.122 To make jury instructions more effective in this regard, some advocate
for jury instructions tailored to the variables that might distort eyewitness
identification in each individual case.123
Some jurisdictions allow an expert witness to testify about the unreliability
of eyewitness identification testimony if the expert testimony is deemed
reliable under the Daubert standard, which applies to all expert evidence.124
However, other courts remain resistant to admitting expert testimony on the
unreliability of eyewitness evidence, claiming that eyewitness identification
evidence is not beyond the understanding of the jurors.125 Further, studies
suggest that expert testimony on eyewitness identification evidence does not
have the intended effect of sensitizing the jury to make more informed
decisions about eyewitness identification accuracy; rather, expert testimony in
this area tends to make jurors generally skeptical of an eyewitness’s
identification.126
Finally, although these safeguards operate after the eyewitness
identification has already occurred,127 some courts have also created
121 See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (discussing United
States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir. 1971)).
122 Koosed, supra note 120.
123 Id. at 620 n.124.
124 See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311−12 (6th Cir. 2000) (supporting “the emerging
view that expert testimony may be offered, in certain circumstances, on the subject of the psychological factors
which influence the memory process”); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that expert psychological testimony about the validity of eyewitness identification has been held admissible if
the identification contains problems such as “cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay,
identification after observation under stress, and psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and
unconscious transference”); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (accepting the
“modern conclusion” that expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony may be
admissible under some circumstances); see also Schmechel et al., supra note 115, at 186 n.41 (noting that ten
states and one federal circuit allow expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony
under some circumstances).
125 See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Purham, 725
F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 631 (Pa. 1995); see also Schmechel
et al., supra note 115. Despite this belief that eyewitness identification unreliability is within the understanding
of jurors, psychological research suggests that jurors actually do not understand specific factors that make
eyewitness identification more or less reliable. See supra text accompanying note 115.
126 Jennifer L. Devenport & Brian L. Cutler, Research Report, Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing
Eyewitness Experts on Juror Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 569, 570 (2004).
127 Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 279–80.
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safeguards that operate during the eyewitness identification procedure itself,
with the goal of facilitating more reliable identification procedures by reducing
system variables within the control of the justice system. For example, New
Jersey courts have applied psychological research about how eyewitness
memory works to their identification procedures, instituting double-blind
administration of lineups,128 pre-identification instructions that the perpetrator
may not be present in a lineup, a choice of lineup fillers who fit the description
of the perpetrator, and avoidance of any feedback following the
identification.129 Although these types of reforms begin to bring identification
procedures in line with what is known about eyewitness memory, procedural
changes can only help alleviate errors in identification caused by system
variables.130
II. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL
SAFEGUARDS
Although other types of eyewitness evidence can also be unreliable,
eyewitness identifications are particularly troublesome, justifying more
scrutiny than other eyewitness evidence. Eyewitness identification testimony
possesses a “unique confluence of features . . . [that] can undermine the
fairness of a trial.”131 In particular, eyewitness identification evidence is
potentially unreliable, has a powerful impact on the jury, and is not subject to
the protections typically afforded by the adversarial process.132
As noted in Part I, one factor contributing to the uniqueness of eyewitness
identification testimony is the danger of unreliability that is characteristic of
this type of evidence.133 Mistaken eyewitness identification evidence is the
leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States.134 This suggests
that eyewitness identifications are not just theoretically unreliable in the
controlled experimental settings cited above in Part I, but that eyewitness
identifications also have a demonstrated unreliability in practice. The Supreme
Court has also readily acknowledged the unreliable nature of eyewitness
128 In a double-blind lineup, both the lineup administrator and the eyewitness are unaware of which lineup
member is the prime suspect. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896 (N.J. 2011). This helps avoid any
unconscious or conscious influence on the eyewitness. Id.
129 Id. at 897–99.
130 See Wells & Olson, supra note 10, at 279−80.
131 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730–31 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 1.
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testimony, stating that “the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.”135
Another factor that distinguishes eyewitness identification testimony is its
degree of influence on the jury.136 Despite indications that eyewitness
identification is particularly prone to error, eyewitness identification testimony
remains a convincing and powerful form of evidence, and jurors often rely
heavily on it.137 One experiment with a mock jury suggested that eyewitness
identification testimony dramatically increases jurors’ willingness to find a
defendant guilty: the addition of the testimony of an eyewitness identifying a
defendant as the perpetrator of a crime increased the jurors’ likelihood of
finding the defendant guilty from 18% without eyewitness identification
testimony to 72% with eyewitness identification testimony.138 Outside the
laboratory, the enormous influence of eyewitness identification testimony is
borne out in statistical analyses of conviction rates in crimes involving
eyewitness identification.139 For example, the Devlin Report—an investigation
of criminal convictions based on eyewitness identification—observed that
British juries found criminal defendants guilty in 74% of cases in which
eyewitness identification testimony was the only evidence against the
defendant.140
Finally, eyewitness identification evidence is also unique because
traditional rationales for admitting other types of unreliable evidence do not
apply to eyewitness evidence, for eyewitness evidence is “resistan[t] to the
ordinary tests of the adversarial process.”141 In particular, the adversarial
process is meant to help uncover lies and misinformation.142 Unreliable
evidence may be admitted with the knowledge that the jury ultimately decides
the credibility and the trustworthiness of the evidence, in part based on the
demeanor of a witness.143 Under this rationale, the jury can conclude that a
135 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112
(1977) (“[A] witness’[s] recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later
actions of the police.”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (noting that the Court recognizes the
“dangers and unfairness inherent in confrontations for identification”).
136 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
137 See LOFTUS, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that “[j]urors have been known to accept eyewitness
testimony pointing to guilt even when it is far outweighed by evidence of innocence”); see also id. at 19.
138 Id. at 9−10.
139 Id. at 8–9.
140 Id.
141 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
142 Epstein, supra note 113.
143 Id. at 772.

WALKER GALLEYSPROOFS1

1226

6/3/2013 10:53 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1205

witness is untruthful or that a witness is unsure about his or her testimony.144
However, as noted in Part I, extending this rationale to eyewitness
identification testimony is questionable.145 Generally, inaccurate eyewitness
identifications arise not from intentional manipulation or deception by the
eyewitness, but instead from eyewitnesses who made a mistake based on
problems with perception, memory, or identification procedures.146 Because
eyewitnesses often believe their identifications are correct, the jury is unlikely
to glean meaningful information about the reliability of the eyewitnesses’
testimony in this way.147
The traditional, built-in protections of the adversarial process, especially
cross-examination, are also inadequate because jurors do not have an adequate
sense of what factors make an eyewitness’s identification particularly reliable
or unreliable.148 Studies suggest that jurors are unable to separate reliable
eyewitness identification testimony from eyewitness testimony that is
unreliable.149 For example, jurors and other lay people are particularly
impressed with eyewitnesses who express confidence in their identification of
the perpetrator, tending to believe that higher confidence in the identification is
indicative of greater accuracy of the identification.150 However, as noted
above, psychological evidence suggests that the correlation between
confidence in an identification and accuracy of the identification—that is,
whether the eyewitness identifies the true perpetrator—is not high.151 Thus, an
eyewitness may have an “artificially inflated confidence in an identification[],”
making it difficult for the jury to determine credibility and reliability. In turn,
this inability to determine reliability “jeopardizes the defendant’s basic right to
144

Id. at 758−60.
Id. at 783−84.
146 Id. at 732.
147 Id. at 766.
148 Schmechel et al., supra note 115. In fact, one study comparing the responses of lay people and experts
on eyewitness identification issues suggested that lay people’s beliefs about eyewitness identification differed
from expert opinion on as many as 87% of the issues examined (including the importance of pre-lineup
instructions, cross-race bias, and weapon focus). Tanja Rapus Brenton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not
Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 118−20 (2006).
149 Schmechel et al., supra note 115, at 195.
150 Id. at 199; see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 732 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[A]n eyewitness’[s] artificially inflated confidence in an identification’s accuracy complicates the jury’s task
of assessing witness credibility and reliability.”); Lisa Steele, Trying Identification Cases: An Outline for
Raising Eyewitness ID Issues, CHAMPION, Nov. 2004, at 8, available at LexisNexis, 28 Champion 8 (“Crossexamination tends to focus on the witness’[s] confidence, a very misleading indicator. Wrong, and impeached,
a confident witness is still likely to be believed.”).
151 LOFTUS, supra note 7, at 177; Douglass & Steblay, supra note 39, at 865.
145
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subject his accuser to meaningful cross-examination.”152 In addition, surveys
of jurors indicate that jurors tend to not understand that memory does not
operate in a fashion similar to a video camera, but is largely reconstructive in
nature.153 For these reasons, jurors may have difficulty determining the
reliability of an eyewitness’s identification based on the eyewitness’s
demeanor or based on the jurors’ intuitive understanding of memory.
The discrepancy between the heavy weight jurors tend to place on
eyewitness identification testimony and the potential unreliability of
eyewitness identifications makes eyewitness identification testimony a
particularly troublesome issue. Although eyewitness identification can be
distorted by many factors, it remains a crucial type of evidence used to bring
the guilty to justice. Thus, the legal system must balance the need for
eyewitness identification testimony with the dangers of its unreliability.
In attempting to reach this balance between the utility of eyewitness
identification evidence and the harmful effects of its unreliability, the Supreme
Court has treated eyewitness identification testimony differently than other
types of eyewitness testimony.154 The Court recognized the uniqueness of
eyewitness identifications, singling out eyewitness identification testimony in
Stovall, Biggers, and Manson.155 In establishing that all identifications yielded
from unnecessarily suggestive police procedures should be screened for indicia
of reliability,156 the Court suggests that eyewitness identifications are
distinguishable from other types of eyewitness testimony. In Manson, the
Court stated that the eyewitness identification line of cases “reflect[s] the
concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has
aspects of reliability.”157 In the Manson line of cases, the Court felt that some
types of eyewitness identification evidence were sufficiently unreliable to
warrant allowing the judge to screen the evidence for reliability, thus taking
152 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 732 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298
(1967)).
153 Schmechel et al., supra note 115, at 191, 195.
154 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720–21 (describing the safeguards for eyewitness identification testimony);
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 98–99 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1972); Stovall, 388
U.S. at 294.
155 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731, 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Manson, 432 U.S. at 98–99; Biggers, 409
U.S. at 196–97; Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294.
156 See, e.g., Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720 (“This Court has recognized . . . a due process check on the
admission of eyewitness identification, applicable when the police have arranged suggestive circumstances
leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.”).
157 Manson, 432 U.S. at 112. The Court concluded “that reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony.” Id. at 114.
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this task away from the jury.158 Though the court in Perry limited this
screening role to cases in which the police orchestrated suggestive
identification procedures,159 the underlying rationale of promoting reliability in
eyewitness identifications is present with or without improper police
behavior.160
This Comment posits that eyewitness identification testimony—with its
numerous potential sources of unreliability, capacity to influence the jury, and
resistance to the ordinary tests of the adversarial process—is distinguishable
from other types of evidence. Because eyewitness identification testimony is
unique in this regard, this Comment proposes that the heightened evidentiary
standard for admitting expert testimony—as articulated in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence 702161—should inform
courts on whether to admit eyewitness identification testimony. Because
Daubert’s heightened standard places an emphasis on reliability, which is also
the primary concern in admitting eyewitness identification evidence,162
Daubert should serve as an example of the approach courts should take in
addressing eyewitness identification evidence, with the goal of reducing the
number of mistaken identifications that result in false convictions.
III. DAUBERT’S HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
The heightened evidentiary standard for admitting expert evidence can
inform courts about how to approach the problem of unreliable eyewitness
identification evidence. Part III discusses the heightened standard of reliability
for admitting expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
A. Daubert Framework
Courts have long applied heightened evidentiary requirements to scientific
evidence and other types of expert evidence.163 Currently, federal courts adhere
to the heightened admissibility standard for scientific evidence articulated in

158

Id. at 112.
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720.
160 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
161 FED. R. EVID. 702.
162 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591−92 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
159
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and Federal Rule of Evidence
702.164
In Daubert, the Court noted that to be admissible, all scientific evidence
must be not only relevant but also reliable.165 It required that trial courts serve
a gatekeeping function, ensuring that any scientific evidence admitted at the
trial meets both the requirements of relevance and reliability.166 To serve this
gatekeeping function, when faced with expert scientific testimony,167 trial
courts must determine at the outset of the trial “whether the expert is proposing
to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue.”168 The Court listed several factors for
courts to consider in making the determination of whether expert evidence is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.169 For example, courts in
their gatekeeping role should consider whether the scientific theory or
technique has been tested.170 Additionally, courts should consider whether the
scientific theory or technique has been peer reviewed and published.171 Courts

164 FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591−92. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”)
provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 702.
Though Rule 702 and Daubert provide the admissibility standard for expert evidence in federal courts, another
standard is applied in several states. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Essay, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005). This standard was first
articulated in Frye v. United States, finding that the standard for admitting scientific evidence was a “general
acceptance” test in which novel scientific evidence was only admissible if the evidence was generally accepted
in the scientific community. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. While the majority of state courts later adopted versions of
the FRE and thus apply the Daubert standard, Cheng & Yoon, supra, at 473, some states—including New
York and California—continue to adhere to the Frye general-acceptance test. See People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321, 331 (Cal. 1994) (in bank); People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996) (applying the Frye test).
165 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591−92.
166 Id. at 589. These requirements are often referred to as “fit” and reliability. Note, Reliable Evaluation of
Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2152 & n.50 (2003). “Fit” encompasses how well the expert
evidence pertains to the issue in the case. Id.
167 The Court in footnote eleven of the Daubert opinion interpreted Rule 702 to apply to all scientific
evidence, not just novel scientific evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.11.
168 Id. at 592; see also Linda Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert’s Gatekeeper: The Role of
the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (1994).
169 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. The Court noted, however, that this list of factors is not a definitive
checklist; rather, additional factors may be considered when appropriate. Id. at 593. For example, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether the expert testimony was prepared exclusively for litigation. Metabolife Int’l, Inc.
v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit added a factor relating to whether the expert
has eliminated other possible explanations. Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 2001).
170 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
171 Id.
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should also consider the rate of error associated with the scientific theory or
technique at issue as well as its general acceptance.172
After Daubert articulated the trial court’s gatekeeping role in ensuring the
reliability of scientific evidence, two subsequent cases clarified the reach of
Daubert.173 In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court extended trial courts’
gatekeeping function to the determination of the reliability of all expert
evidence, not just expert scientific evidence.174 Further, in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, the Court determined that an abuse-of-discretion standard is
appropriate in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony.175
B. Rationale for Heightened Standard for Expert Evidence
With modern advances in science and technology, scientific and other
expert evidence has gained importance in both civil and criminal cases.176
However, the increased presence of science and technology in the legal system
has also caused hesitation about admitting “junk science” and other expert
testimony that may contain errors.177 Further, the introduction of expert
testimony also raised concerns about the trust the jury ascribes to experts.178
Expert testimony is meant to educate jurors, teaching them about the scientific
or technical knowledge necessary to understand a case.179 Thus, by definition,
expert testimony consists of matters that are beyond the ken of the jurors,
meaning that the jurors have no basis with which to evaluate reliability of the

172

Id. at 594.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147−48 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
138−39 (1997); see also G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 942 (1996); Megan Dillhoff, Note, Science, Law, and Truth: Defining
the Scope of the Daubert Trilogy, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1289, 1295–99 (2011).
174 526 U.S. at 147. Extending the Daubert gatekeeping–reliability framework beyond scientific evidence
to all expert testimony may necessitate that courts consider different factors than the ones originally listed in
Daubert: the factors in Daubert are most helpful in determining the admissibility of scientific testimony. Id. at
150−51. For other types of expert testimony, the Court noted that trial courts have discretion to select factors
to be considered in the admissibility determination. Id.
175 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139.
176 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5168, at 86 & n.1 (1978).
177 James E. Starrs, There’s Something About Novel Scientific Evidence, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 417, 418−19
(1999).
178 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in
Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 220−21 (2006).
179 Id.
173
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scientific or technical testimony.180 Due to their lack of scientific and technical
knowledge, jurors are reliant on the expert witness to interpret the scientific or
technical information, making them likely to put faith in the expert’s testimony
or even to overestimate the significance of results that the expert reports.181 In
this way, there is the potential for expert testimony to mislead the jury because
jurors have no background with which to evaluate the expert testimony for
accuracy or reliability.182
For this reason, courts have been wary of allowing all expert evidence to be
admissible.183 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert were formulated to
address this danger of unreliable expert testimony through a special,
heightened standard for the admission of scientific and expert evidence.184
Daubert imposes a heightened standard of admissibility for scientific and
technical information, with the trial judge acting as the gatekeeper.185 The
paradigm created by Daubert is one in which the jury is prevented from
exercising its usual role in determining the credibility and reliability of
witnesses.186 However, the Court in Daubert found that the reliability concerns
of expert scientific and technical testimony were significant enough to justify
allowing trial judges to decide what is typically within the province of the
jury.187 By entrusting trial judges with a gatekeeping role, the Court indicated
that the dangers of unreliable testimony—in the case of Daubert, the danger of
the jury being taken in by an aura of expertise—can take precedence over the
traditional roles of the judge and jury.188

180 Id. at 220; see Nancy A. Miller, Daubert and Junk Science: Have Admissibility Standards Changed?,
61 DEF. COUNS. J. 501, 516 (1994).
181 See Miller, supra note 180, at 503 (explaining that jurors may find an innocent defendant liable based
solely upon the “unreliable or spurious scientific reasoning” of expert witnesses). Studies have shown that
jurors tend to accept expert evidence, particularly if the expert is qualified, is familiar with the facts of the
case, and has good communicative skills. Daniel W. Shuman et al., Juror Assessments of the Believability of
Expert Witnesses: A Literature Review, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 371, 379−80, 382 (1996).
182 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 178, at 220.
183 Starrs, supra note 177, at 418−19. As the Court in Daubert noted, “Expert evidence can be both
powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.” 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (quoting
Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D.
631, 632 (1991)).
184 See Starrs, supra note 177, at 418; see also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(explaining the rule of admissibility for scientific expert testimony before Daubert).
185 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
186 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 178, at 224−26.
187 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
188 See id. at 589, 593, 596−97.
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The next Part argues that the rationale underlying the adoption of a
gatekeeping standard for scientific and technical evidence—the danger of
unreliability due to the distinctive features of the evidence and the
persuasiveness of the witness that is testifying—is similar to the danger of
unreliability in eyewitness identification testimony. Thus, it proposes that
Daubert’s heightened admissibility standard should inform courts about how to
approach the problem of unreliability in eyewitness identification testimony.
IV. APPLYING A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY TO EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
As described above, eyewitness identification evidence is often
unreliable,189 highly persuasive to juries,190 and at least partially resistant to the
built-in protections of the adversarial system.191 Because of this distinctive
combination of characteristics, eyewitness identification evidence poses a
particularly worrisome danger of leading to a miscarriage of justice—which
distinguishes it from eyewitness evidence more generally.192
Accordingly, eyewitness identification evidence warrants additional
judicial scrutiny that differs from the typical standard for other types of
eyewitness evidence. This Part sets out a novel framework to address this need
for added safeguards for eyewitness identification information. Section A
draws parallels between the rationales for the heightened admissibility standard
for expert scientific evidence in Daubert and this Comment’s proposed
recommendation for additional judicial attention for eyewitness identification
evidence. Section B then advocates for a novel framework in which Daubert’s
heightened standard for admitting expert scientific evidence—based on a
reliability assessment—informs trial courts about how to approach the
admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence by similarly assessing the
evidence for its reliability. Under this proposed framework, trial courts would
consider both system and estimator variables in determining the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence.

189
190
191
192

See supra text accompanying notes 131–33.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–38.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730–31 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id.
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A. Eyewitness Identification Evidence Compared to Expert Evidence
A driving force behind the heightened standard for expert scientific and
technical evidence was the fear of inaccurate, unreliable science being
admitted into evidence.193 A similar rationale exists with eyewitness
identification evidence: courts have long recognized the potential inaccuracy
and unreliability of eyewitness identifications.194
Further, for expert scientific and technical evidence, the potential
unreliability of the evidence was not the only factor that led the Court to
impose a heightened admissibility standard.195 Rather, the inability of jurors to
evaluate the reliability of expert scientific and technical evidence served as
another important consideration.196 Scientific and technical information is
beyond the understanding of a typical juror, and thus the jury has no body of
knowledge with which to evaluate the accuracy or reliability of the expert
evidence.197 As a result, the jury is reliant on the expert’s testimony.198
Similarly, for eyewitness identification evidence, jurors are also unable to
evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony because jurors
have little conception about how factors such as confidence and stress level
affect the reliability of an identification.199 Additionally, the jury is impeded in
evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony because
unreliable testimony in this area may arise from a mistaken identification, not
an intentionally misleading one.200 Therefore, typical safeguards based on the
veracity of the witness do not help the jury when the eyewitness is genuinely
mistaken.201
Thus, just as with expert evidence, eyewitness identification evidence
suffers from the danger of unreliability coupled with the jury’s inability to
evaluate the level of reliability of the evidence presented.202 In Daubert, the
Court found this combination of factors to be compelling enough to impose a
heightened standard of admissibility for expert evidence, dependent on the trial
193

See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 178, at 224–26.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977).
195 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 178, at 219−20, 224−26.
196 Id. at 219–20.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Schmechel et al., supra note 115, at 194.
200 See Epstein, supra note 113 (referring to the limits of cross-examination in confronting truthful, but
mistaken, witnesses).
201 Id.; Wells et al., supra note 38, at 609.
202 See Epstein, supra note 113; Wells et al., supra note 38, at 609.
194
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judge’s finding of reliability.203 In doing so, the Court departed from the
traditional role of the jury—to assess a witness’s credibility and reliability—
and instead redistributed this role to trial courts through Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.204
Similarly, courts should consider the rationale behind the heightened
standard of admissibility for expert scientific evidence, rooted in a trial judge’s
reliability assessment, when considering the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence. Although recommending that courts consider the
principles underlying Daubert in admitting eyewitness identification evidence
may invade the traditional province of the jury to determine reliability, this
intrusion is justifiable. First, as with expert evidence, a combination of factors
makes eyewitness identification evidence a uniquely troublesome area that a
judge may be more suited to decide.205 Second, the consequences of unreliable
evidence in eyewitness identification testimony could be as grave as the
consequences of unreliable expert testimony in criminal cases because both
inaccurate expert testimony and mistaken eyewitness identification can result
in wrongful convictions.
B. Proposal for Daubert Serving as a Model for Admissibility Assessments in
Eyewitness Identification Evidence
To address the problem of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence,
this Comment proposes that trial courts should look to Daubert as a loose
model when making an admissibility decision for this type of evidence,
drawing on Daubert’s emphasis on the reliability of the evidence as the key to
its admissibility. Under this proposed approach, the trial judge, similar to
judges following the Daubert framework, would evaluate the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence as a factor in its admissibility. The proposed
framework would depart from the Manson due process test206 in several ways.

203

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 178, at 218, 224−26.
205 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730–31 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
206 Under the Manson due process test for evaluating the admissibility of eyewitness identification
evidence, courts first determine if the identification was yielded from an impermissibly suggestive
identification procedure. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977). As Perry clarified, this step only
applies to police-orchestrated suggestive procedures. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 730. Then, if the procedure was
found to be impermissibly suggestive, the court looks to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine if the
identification is nevertheless reliable. Manson, 432 U.S. at 106. Factors to be considered under the totality of
the circumstances include view, attention, certainty, time between the crime and the identification, and
accuracy of the description. Id. at 114−16.
204
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First, it would not be based on due process, but instead on an evidentiary
reliability rationale. Second, the proposed framework differs from the current
approach because it would apply more broadly to all eyewitness identification
evidence, not just evidence resulting from suggestive circumstances. Finally,
the proposed framework would consider a range of both estimator and system
variables under the totality of the circumstances.
1. A Shift from a Due Process Rationale to an Evidentiary One
The suggested framework outlined below does not argue for an extension
of due process protection to eyewitness identifications made under any
suggestive circumstances, as the majority in Perry contemplated and
rejected.207 In Perry, the Court was concerned that extending due process
protections to non-police-orchestrated suggested procedures would result in
“vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint on the admission
of evidence.”208 The proposed framework does not raise the same concern, for
the suggested framework does not rest on a due process basis at all. Instead,
this Comment contemplates a framework that would be based on evidentiary
concerns about the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. Further,
its adoption would be discretionary upon the states.
While this Comment does not advocate for enlarging the reach of due
process, the centrality of reliability in the due process cases highlights how
crucial reliability determinations are to eyewitness identifications. The Court in
Perry rightly noted that the potential for unreliability of a type of evidence
does not alone cause its admission to be unfair; specifically, it stated that
jailhouse informant testimony is also notoriously unreliable yet is routinely
admissible without any reliability prescreening by a trial court.209 However, in
making this comparison, the Court overlooked the elements of eyewitness
identification evidence that make its unchecked admittance more unfair than
admittance of other types of unreliable evidence. As the dissent in Perry noted,
jailhouse informant testimony is viewed with skepticism by the jury.210 Thus,
this type of unreliable testimony is distinguishable because it is likely to be
scrutinized by the jury, whereas eyewitness identification testimony is
typically highly influential with the jury and imminently believable.211
207
208
209
210
211

See supra text accompanying notes 82–84.
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Other types of evidence raise similar reliability concerns and are subject to
special evidentiary treatment outside of due process protections; for example,
both hypnotically refreshed testimony and polygraph evidence have limited
admissibility or are not admissible, based on concerns that are mirrored in
eyewitness identification testimony.212 In particular, research has shown that
hypnotically refreshed testimony has the potential to be unreliable and yet
instill a high sense of false confidence in an eyewitness.213 Many courts have
responded to this unreliability by limiting the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony.214 The concern about the unreliability of hypnotically
refreshed testimony is analogous to the problem of unreliable eyewitness
identification testimony, for eyewitness identification evidence has similar
problems of unreliability, which may be coupled with a false sense of
confidence. Thus, limiting admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence
under the proposed revision of the totality-of-the-circumstances framework is
consistent with courts’ treatment of other unreliable types of evidence.
Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert’s heightened standard
of admissibility for expert scientific evidence is another area that conditions
admissibility upon reliability concerns, not due process.215 As noted above, the
problem of unchecked, unreliable expert evidence was the driving force behind
Daubert as well.216 As the treatment of hypnotically refreshed testimony and
expert evidence suggests, a reliability-based evidentiary standard for
eyewitness identification evidence could find support in other reliability-based
evidentiary doctrines.

212 See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) (finding that “excluding polygraph
evidence in all military trials . . . is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in
barring unreliable evidence”); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1366 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) (adopting several
procedural requirements that must be met before a party may introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony);
State v. Moore, 902 A.2d 1212, 1213 (N.J. 2006) (noting that because it is unclear “whether post-hypnotic
testimony can ever be as reliable as testimony that is based on ordinary recall . . . . hypnotically refreshed
testimony of a witness in a criminal trial is generally inadmissible”).
213 See, e.g., Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1366; Moore, 902 A.2d at 1213. The issue of hypnotically refreshed
testimony arises when an eyewitness undergoes hypnosis with the aim of helping them to remember a
particular event, such as a crime, in greater detail. See, e.g., Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1363. Hypnotically refreshed
testimony is deemed highly unreliable due to the heightened suggestibility of a hypnotized witness, which may
cause the witness to manufacture false statements. Id. at 1362–64.
214 See, e.g., Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1366; Moore, 902 A.2d at 1213.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 183–84.
216 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–91 (1993).
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2. A Broader Test for Reliability
The current Manson framework has a reliability component, in which the
judge must determine whether an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is so
unreliable that it violates due process.217 Importantly, under Manson, the court
only reaches the issue of reliability if it first finds that law enforcement
orchestrated an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.218 However, the use of
suggestive procedures to elicit potentially unreliable eyewitness testimony is
damaging to the defendant regardless of whether the suggestive procedures in
question were orchestrated by the police.219 Distinguishing between policeorchestrated and non-police-orchestrated suggestive procedures shifts the focus
of the eyewitness identification problem away from unreliability, which is the
main concern.220 In fact, the Court in Manson emphasized that “reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony”;221
yet, by limiting the reliability determination to circumstances involving
improper police behavior, the Court allowed juries to hear potentially
unreliable eyewitness identifications. Further, the Court’s decision in Perry—
which limited due process protections to suggestive circumstances orchestrated
by the police and not to all other suggestive circumstances222—glossed over
the reality that eyewitness identifications can be equally unreliable under any
suggestive circumstances, regardless of the cause.
The suggested approach in this Comment addresses this problem. Instead
of drawing distinctions between formal, police-orchestrated suggestive
circumstances and informal suggestive circumstances that arise without police
involvement, this Comment argues for a broader division—one between
eyewitness identifications and all other types of eyewitness evidence. As the
psychological literature on eyewitness identifications and memory suggests,
eyewitness identification evidence presents a unique problem within the
general category of eyewitness evidence—it is particularly unreliable and
beyond the understanding of the jury.223
In the realm of expert scientific evidence and Daubert, these
characteristics—unreliability and being beyond the ken of the jury—merit
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

See supra text accompanying notes 56–64.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977).
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 720–21.
See supra text accompanying notes 148–53.
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judicial screening for reliability of all expert scientific evidence that any party
seeks to admit. This feature of Daubert, with its emphasis on reliability, would
be helpful to trial courts in determining the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence: trial courts could determine the reliability of all
eyewitness identifications as a central component of admissibility.
Thus, all eyewitness identification evidence, regardless of the presence or
absence of suggestive circumstances and regardless of police orchestration,
should be reviewed for indicia of reliability. This change would shift the
court’s consideration away from the narrow issue of the involvement of law
enforcement—which is tangential to reliability—to an actual reliability
evaluation that includes not only system variables, such as suggestive police
procedures, but also estimator variables such as cross-race identifications.
3. Consideration of Both System and Estimator Variables in the Totality of
the Circumstances
Currently, the courts use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the
reliability of eyewitness identifications under Manson.224 The idea underlying
this test is commendable—the reliability of an identification is not readily
determined, and there are many factors that likely contribute to an unreliable
identification.225 Thus, the proposed framework maintains a totality-of-thecircumstances test for determining the reliability of eyewitness identification
evidence, which will in turn help determine the admissibility of the evidence.
However, the factors the Court set out in Manson—view, attention, accuracy,
confidence, and the passing of time226—must be adjusted to align with current
research on eyewitness identifications. Further, the proposed framework argues
that courts should consider both system227 and estimator variables228 as part of
the analysis under the totality of the circumstances.
Modern psychological research on eyewitness memory draws attention to
the need to make some alterations to the current Manson factors. Although
estimator variables are outside of the control of the justice system, they still
affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification and should thus be
considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances test.

224
225
226
227
228

Manson, 432 U.S. at 110, 112.
See supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
For a discussion of system variables, see supra Part I.A.2.
For a discussion of estimator variables, see supra Part I.A.1.
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Estimator variables that should be incorporated in the totality-of-thecircumstances reliability determination include the distance and lighting during
observation of the crime as well as the time elapsed between the crime and the
identification. Further, social science research has shown that eyewitnesses are
less accurate at making cross-race identifications.229 Thus, when considering
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, courts should take into account the
added difficulty of identifying persons of different races. Courts should also
consider the eyewitness’s stress level during the crime because research
suggests that eyewitness identification memory is impaired when the
eyewitness experiences a high level of stress.230 The presence or absence of a
weapon during the commission of the crime should also be a factor, because
research suggests that eyewitnesses are prone to weapon focus, which detracts
from their ability to accurately identify the perpetrator of a crime.231
Additionally, under the proposed framework, the Manson factor of
eyewitness confidence would play a limited role in determining the reliability
of an eyewitness identification because research has shown that confidence is a
poor indicator of the reliability of an eyewitness identification.232 Thus, when
the trial judge considers the totality of the circumstances, the judge should not
place significant weight on this factor.
In addition to these estimator variables that should be considered in the
totality of the circumstances, the proposed framework also includes system
variables in the reliability analysis. In the current Manson approach, courts
consider system variables in the first prong, which asks whether there are
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances orchestrated by the police.233 However,
as discussed above, Manson’s first prong creates an artificial distinction that is
not grounded in the reliability of the eyewitness identification, and
accordingly, courts should conduct a reliability determination for all
eyewitness identification evidence. Thus, the proposed framework would
necessarily jettison this prong of the Manson test, because there would no
longer be a need to find suggestive circumstances in order to do a totality-ofthe-circumstances reliability determination—the totality-of-the-circumstances

229
230
231
232
233

Note, supra note 12, at 976, 982.
See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
Douglass & Steblay, supra note 39.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977).
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determination would be the default for all eyewitness identifications.234 Within
the totality-of-the-circumstances determination, the court should consider the
effects of various system variables on reliability.
System variables that courts should consider in this totality-of-thecircumstances test include characteristics of a lineup procedure. For example,
courts should address whether the identification was elicited from a doubleblind lineup procedure—in which the lineup administrator does not know who
the prime suspect is in the lineup—because this procedure helps reduce
inaccuracies in identification caused by the lineup administrator’s bias toward
a particular lineup member.235 Further, another factor is whether the
eyewitness was given unbiased pre-identification lineup instructions informing
the eyewitness that the perpetrator may not be present in the lineup—research
suggests that this instruction reduces the number of mistaken identifications in
lineups where the perpetrator is absent.236 Trial courts should also consider
whether eyewitnesses were given positive feedback because feedback
reinforcing eyewitnesses’ choice from a lineup can inflate their confidence in
the identification.237 Further, courts should address whether the lineup contains
a sufficient number and type of fillers and whether the lineup was
simultaneous or sequential.238 If law enforcement did not utilize a formal
lineup but instead actively or passively allowed the eyewitness to make an
identification based on a show-up, this is a factor to be considered in the
totality of the circumstances affecting reliability and thus admissibility.239
As outlined above, this framework envisions reliability screening for all
eyewitness identification evidence and not just identifications made under
police-orchestrated suggestive procedures. Further, it considers both system
and estimator variables in the reliability determination. Because of this
broadened scope of review, this framework may require increased judicial time
and resources compared to the current Manson test. However, the goal of this

234 In a recent state court opinion on eyewitness testimony, the New Jersey Supreme Court implemented
its own revision of the Manson test, incorporating many of the additional system and estimator variables that
are explored below. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920–21 (N.J. 2011). However, the New Jersey Supreme
Court preserved Manson’s two-step structure: it continues to require a showing of suggestive circumstances in
lineup conditions before conducting a full analysis of both system and estimator variables that might affect
reliability. Id.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
239 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 902–03.
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framework—to reduce mistaken eyewitness identifications—makes the use of
these additional judicial resources worthwhile. Further, having more stringent
requirements for eyewitness identification evidence may result in the
inadmissibility of accurate eyewitness identifications on occasion. To address
this concern, the proposed framework aims to be more sensitive to factors of
reliability in eyewitness identification compared to the Manson test,
considering a wider variety of both system and estimator variables under the
totality of the circumstances.
Thus, this Comment argues that Daubert’s emphasis on the reliability of
expert scientific evidence as a condition for admissibility should inform courts
about how to approach the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence
because reliability concerns are paramount in eyewitness identification
evidence as well. Under the proposed framework, the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence is key. The proposed framework screens all eyewitness
identification evidence for reliability due to the unique nature of eyewitness
identification testimony that distinguishes it from other types of evidence. The
reliability determination of eyewitness identification evidence should be based
on a totality-of-the-circumstances assessment in which both system and
estimator variables are considered.
CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “‘the annals of criminal law are
rife with instances of mistaken identification.’”240 Because eyewitness
identification evidence is distinctive in its combination of unreliability,
influence on the jury, and resistance to the traditional protections of the
adversarial system, it should be scrutinized more closely than other types of
eyewitness evidence. In particular, courts should apply a discretionary
framework in which they base the admissibility of eyewitness identification
evidence upon its reliability, much in the same way that expert scientific
evidence is subject to a heightened reliability-based scrutiny under Daubert.
Under this framework, all eyewitness identifications should be subject to a
reliability determination, regardless of suggestive circumstances during the
identification procedure, because eyewitness identification reliability can be
affected by both procedural system variables as well as intrinsic estimator
variables. Thus, in considering the reliability of an eyewitness identification,
240 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
228 (1967)).
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courts should look to the totality of the circumstances, considering both
estimator variables and system variables as they contribute to a reliability
assessment.
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